In this paper, we consider finite normal form games satisfying transference of decisionmaker indifference. We show that any set of strategies surviving k rounds of elimination of some weakly dominated strategies can be reduced to a set of strategies equivalent to the set of strategies surviving k rounds of elimination of all weakly dominated strategies in every round by (at most k) further rounds of elimination of weakly dominated strategies. 
Introduction
For the class of normal form games where a finite number of players have strict preferences over a finite set of outcomes (utility vectors), Gretlein (1983) showed that the set * Tel.: +45 35323561; fax: +45 35323085.
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0304-4068/$ -see front matter © 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.jmateco. 2003.11.013 of outcomes resulting from iterative elimination of some weakly dominated strategies contains the set of outcomes that remains from a procedure removing all weakly dominated strategies in every step until no more strategies can be removed.
In this paper, we extend this result and show that any set of strategies surviving k rounds of elimination of some weakly dominated strategies can be reduced to a set of strategies equivalent to the strategies surviving k rounds of elimination of all weakly dominated strategies in every round. The reduction can be carried out by at most k further rounds of elimination of some weakly dominated strategies (Theorem 1). From this we obtain a strengthened version of Gretlein's result (Corollary 1). Moreover, the result extends to the class of games satisfying transference of decisionmaker indifference which is less restrictive than strict preferences over outcomes. This conditions says that, for given strategies, if a player obtains the same payoff from shifting to a new strategy, then all other players remain unaffected as well.
We then consider applications and demonstrate how we may obtain a unified approach to the above-mentioned result by Gretlein and recent work by Ewerhart (2000a Ewerhart ( , 2002 and Marx and Swinkels (1997) .
Our first application is to two-player strictly competitive finite games of perfect information. Recently, Ewerhart (2000a) demonstrated that any chess-like game (a strictly competitive, finite game of perfect information with three outcomes) is solved by two rounds of elimination of all weakly dominated strategies. Moreover, he conjectured that the following generalization is true: Any finite, strictly competitive game of perfect information with at most n outcomes is dominance solvable by n − 1 rounds of elimination of all weakly dominated strategies. A proof of this conjecture has now been provided by Ewerhart (2002) . 1 The proof is complicated by the fact that for an extensive form game of perfect information, after one round of elimination of all weakly dominated strategies, the surviving strategies do not necessarily represent the strategic form of any residual extensive form game. 2 In other words, the procedure eliminating all weakly dominated strategies in every step does not correspond to any procedure removing 'dominated' branches from the game tree. Another difficulty is that the procedure eliminating all weakly dominated strategies in every step does not necessarily remove the largest number of strategies from the second round and onwards, compared to other less 'greedy' elimination procedures.
The present paper considers iterative elimination of all weakly subgame dominated strategies, a procedure that intuitively can be viewed as the removal of certain 'dominated' branches in every step. More precisely, after every step, the remaining strategy set is, up to some redundant strategies, the strategy set of a residual extensive form game where what we call 'weakly dominated subgames' have been removed. We claim that any finite, strictly competitive game of perfect information with at most n outcomes is dominance solvable by n − 1 rounds of elimination of weakly subgame dominated strategies (Theorem 2), and give a short and intuitive proof. By combining the results (Theorems 1 and 2), we also obtain the result by Ewerhart (2002) (Corollary 2).
Our second application is to work by Marx and Swinkels (1997) . 3 For the class of finite normal form games satisfying the transference of decisionmaker indifference condition, Marx and Swinkels show that regardless of the order in which weakly dominated strategies are removed, any two full reductions are the same up to removal of redundant strategies and renaming of strategies. We round off by formulating this as a corollary of our main result (Corollary 3).
Preliminaries
We consider a finite set of players I = {1, 2, . . . , m}. Let S i = {s i , s i , . . .} be a finite strategy set for player i, S = S 1 × · · · × S m , and let u i : S → R be a utility function for player i. A game in normal form N(S, u) consists of strategies S = S 1 × · · · × S m and utility functions u = (u 1 , . . . , u m ).
Let s = (s 1 , . . . , s m ) ∈ S and u(s) = (u 1 (s), . . . , u m (s)). We write
Gretlein (1983) studied the class of games satisfying u i (s) = u i (s ) ⇒ u(s) = u(s ) for all i ∈ I, s, s ∈ S, formulated as strict preferences over outcomes. Throughout this paper we relax this condition and assume that u i (s i ,
This condition has been referred to as transference of decisionmaker indifference (TDI), see Marx and Swinkels (1997) for a discussion.
A strategy s i ∈ S i is weakly dominated by
with at least one strict inequality. Without the latter requirement we say that s i is at least as good as s i .
Let F 0 (S) ≡ S, and for k ≥ 1 define 
We say that strategies s i and s i are equivalent w.r.t. Let N andÑ be normal form games with m players and respective strategy sets S and S and utility functions u i andũ i , i = 1, . . . , m. ThenÑ is a reduction of N if there exist surjective maps f i :
for all i and s. We say that N andN are equivalent games, written N ∼N, if they have a common reduction. 4 In words, two games are equivalent if they are identical up to removal of redundant strategies and renaming.
We collect some useful observations below.
The relation ∼ is an equivalence relation on the class of finite normal form games, and if N(S, u) 
Proof. For A.1, see Gretlein (1983) . For A.2, Ewerhart (2000b Ewerhart ( , 2002 provides a proof for the elimination procedure {F k (S)} k≥0 in the two-player case, but the proof applies to any elimination procedure {L k (S)} k≥0 in the m-player case by a change of notation. For A.3, see Ewerhart (2000b) for a proof in the two-player case for k = 1 that easily generalizes to the m-player case and for any k.
Iterated weak dominance
In the following, consider a normal form game N(S, u) satisfying TDI. If R i ⊆ T i for all i we say that R is in T. If R is in S, R induces a game N(R, u| R ) and we occasionally refer to R as a game. For R and T in S, we write R ∼ T if N(R, u| R ) ∼ N(T, u| T ). We can now formulate the main result of this section.
Theorem 1. For any k and L k (S) there is T ∼ F k (S), where T is obtained from L k (S)
by at most k rounds of elimination of some weakly dominated strategies. Gretlein (1983) shows (in his Theorem 2) that
By Theorem 1 above, we obtain the following strengthened version.
In order to prove Theorem 1, we state some intermediate results. Following Gretlein (1983), we write RαT if (i) R is in T, and (ii) for all i and all t i ∈ T i there is r i ∈ R i such that r i is at least as good as t i on T. Moreover, RβT if (i) R is in T, and (ii) for all i and all t i ∈ T i there is r i ∈ R i such that r i is equivalent to t i on T.
Proof. Define R k and T k recursively:
Step 1. First we recall some useful results developed by Gretlein within the proofs of his Lemma 4 and Theorem 1.
If
Gretlein considers games with strict preferences over outcomes, but his results are valid for games satisfying TDI. 5 Gretlein obtains 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 in Gretlein (1983) (p. 112, at lines 3, 15, and 16, respectively) .
Step 2. Let R, T and P be in S. We claim that
A verification of Steps 2.1 and 2.2 is left to the reader.
For Step 2.3, note that since R is in T and T is in P, R is in P. Moreover, since R ∼ T and T ∼ P then by Lemma A.3 R ∼ P implying by Step 2.2 that RβP.
For Step 2.4, since TβP for any p i ∈ P i there is t i ∈ T i equivalent to p i on P −i . Moreover, by RαT , there is r i ∈ R i at least as good as t i on T −i . Now, assume that r i is not at least as good as p i on
Moreover, for all j = i lett j ∈ T j be a strategy equivalent top j w.r.t. P,
Step 3. We claim that R k βF k R and T k βF k T for all k ≥ 0.
We prove the first part of the claim by induction on k. The claim is trivial for k = 0. Assume that R k βF k R for some k ≥ 0. Then by Step 1.1 we have that FR k βF k+1 R. By Step 1.3 R k+1 βFR k . Thus, by Step 2.3 we have R k+1 βF k+1 R.
The proof of the second part is similar.
Step 4. By Step 1.2 R k αT k and by Step 3 T k βF k T thus by Step 2.4 we have R k αF k T . Hence, by Step 3 and Step 2.1,
Lemma 2. LetR be obtained from R by one round of elimination of some weakly dominated strategies, and letT ∼R. Then if P ∼ R there isP obtained from P by one round of elimination of some weakly dominated strategies such that P ∼T .
Proof. By Lemma A.3 ifR ∼P andR ∼T thenT ∼P. Thus, it is sufficient to show that there isP obtained from P by one round of elimination of some weakly dominated strategies such thatR ∼P.
For this, let N(S,ũ) be a common reduction of R and P, and note thatS is equivalent to R and P.
Let f = (f 1 , . . . , f m ) and g = (g 1 , . . . , g m ) be surjective maps from R and P, respectively toS that gives a common reduction. LetS i ≡ f i (R i ) for all i, i.e.S i is the subset of strategies inS i which are the image ofR i ,S =S 1 × · · · ×S m . ThenR is equivalent toS, sinceS is a reduction ofR via surjective maps f i |R i , i = 1, . . . , m, and sinceũ i (f 1 (s 1 ) Finally, since the strategies in R i \R i are weakly dominated w.r.t. R, the strategies inS i \S i are weakly dominated w.r.t.S for all i. Hence, the strategies in P i \P i are weakly dominated w.r.t. P for all i.
Lemma 3. For h = 1, . . . , k letR h be obtained from R h−1 by one round of elimination of some weakly dominated strategies, and let R h ∼R h . Then there is T ∼ R k where T is obtained from R 0 in at most k rounds of elimination of some weakly dominated strategies.
Proof. By induction on k. For k = 1, the claim holds with T =R 1 . Assume that the claim holds for some k ≥ 1. Now, letR h be obtained from R h−1 by one round of elimination of some weakly dominated strategies, and R h ∼R h , h = 1, . . . , k + 1. By the induction hypothesis, there is T ∼ R k where T is obtained from R 0 by at most k rounds of elimination of some weakly dominated strategies. Then by Lemma 2 there isT obtained from T by one round of elimination of some weakly dominated strategies such thatT ∼ R k+1 , and sincē T is obtained from R 0 in at most k + 1 rounds of elimination of some weakly dominated strategies the claim holds for k + 1.
We are then ready to proof Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. We have FL h−1 (S)αL h (S) for all
by one round of elimination of some weakly dominated strategies. Hence, by Lemma 3 there is T ∼ F k (S) where T is obtained from L k (S) by at most k rounds of elimination of some weakly dominated strategies.
Application I: strictly competitive games of perfect information
We now consider a finite, two-player strictly competitive extensive form game G of perfect information. For definitions of standard concepts, see Ewerhart (2000a) (or, for example, Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994) . Let i, j ∈ {1, 2} be players, i = j. X i denotes the set of i's nodes, Z denotes the set of terminal nodes, and X = X i ∪ X j ∪ Z. Let ω i : Z → {1, 2, . . . , n} denote the outcome function, where n is the number of outcomes, ω = (ω 1 , ω 2 ) .
Let G(x) be the subgame starting at x, and let Z(x) be the set of terminal nodes in G(x).
A strategy s i for player i specifies a move at every node x ∈ X i . Let S i be the set of strategies for player i. A pair of strategies s = (s 1 , s 2 ) uniquely determines a path p(s) = (x 0 , . . . , x H ) where x 0 = x 0 (the initial node) and x H = z(s) is a terminal node.
The strategic form N(G) of G is the normal form game with strategy sets S i and utility
It is well known (Moulin, 1979; Gretlein, 1982 Gretlein, , 1983 that G is dominance solvable in a finite number of steps, and that the outcome is equal to the backward induction outcome. The value v(x) = (v 1 (x), v 2 (x)) of x ∈ X is the backward induction outcome of G(x). 6 Now, let x ∈ X\x 0 , and let player i be the player called to move at node y immediately preceding x. Then G(x) is a weakly dominated subgame if
Thus, a proper subgame is weakly dominated if the highest possible outcome within the subgame is not higher than, and the value of the subgame is lower than, the value of the subgame arising from the anterior node (for the player called to move at the anterior node leading to the subgame). We then say that a strategy s i ∈ S i is weakly subgame dominated on S j if there exists s j ∈ S j , such that p(s i , s j ) reaches a weakly dominated subgame. Let E 0 (S) ≡ S, and let E k (S) = E k 1 (S) × E k 2 (S) be the set of strategies not weakly subgame
For any strictly competitive game G with associated strategies S, weak subgame dominance is stronger than weak dominance since a weakly subgame dominated strategy s i is weakly dominated (for example, by a strategy s i which consists of a maxmin strategy at subgames beginning at nodes leading to dominated subgames and equal to s i elsewhere). On the other hand, a weakly dominated strategy does not necessarily lead the outcome path to a weakly dominated subgame.
With the definitions in place, we may then find an upper bound for the number of steps necessary to solve a game of perfect information, removing all dominated subgames at each step.
Theorem 2. Let G be a finite, strictly competitive game of perfect information with at most n outcomes. Then N(G) is subgame dominance solvable in n − 1 steps.
We proceed with the following two lemmas. 
Proof. Let p(s)
, player j is called to move at xh. In the subgame G(xh +1 ), player i has a strategy that ensures the highest possible outcome within this subgame, that is v i (xh +1 ) = max z∈Z(xh +1 ) ω i (z). From Lemma 4, after one round of elimination of weakly subgame dominated strategies all remaining strategy pairs reaching the subgame
, s j is a weakly subgame dominated strategy on E 1 (S).
Note that if strategy s i is weakly subgame dominated and hence reaches a weakly dominated subgame G(x) for some s j , then all other strategies s i leading play to G(x) for some s j are also weakly subgame dominated. Therefore, if a strategy points to a weakly dominated subgame then it must either be a weakly subgame dominated strategy or every weakly dominated subgame this strategy points to cannot be reached by any possible strategy of the opponent and the strategy is therefore equivalent to some strategy that does not point to weakly dominated subgames. Thus, the strategies surviving elimination of all weakly subgame dominated strategies are equivalent to the strategy set of a residual extensive form game where all weakly dominated subgames have been removed. We may now complete the proof of Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. Apply Lemma 5 min{v 1 (x 0 ) − 1, n − v 1 (x 0 )} times, first on G and then sequentially on the residual games where all weakly dominated subgames have been removed in each step. Then apply Lemma 4 once (with x = x 0 ) if necessary. By Lemma A.3 we then obtain that G is subgame dominance solvable in at most n − 1 steps.
Combining Theorems 1 and 2 we also obtain the result by Ewerhart (2002) .
Corollary 2. Any strictly competitive, finite game of perfect information with n outcomes can be solved by n − 1 rounds of elimination of weakly dominated strategies.
Application II: order independence
As another application, we may observe that a corollary of Theorem 1 is the result on order independence by Swinkels (1997, 2000) for pure strategies. A reduction L k (S) is full if there are no weakly dominated strategies in L k (S). For a game sat-isfying TDI, Marx and Swinkels demonstrate that any two full reductions are equivalent (cf. Marx and Swinkels, 1997, Corollary 1, p. 230) .
By Theorem 1, if L k (S) is a full reduction then it must be equivalent to a full reduction obtained by removing all weakly dominated strategies in every round. Thus, we have:
Proof. If L k (S) is a full reduction then by Theorem 1 it is equivalent to F k (S) and F k (S) is a full reduction. Similarly, ifL h (S) is a full reduction then it is equivalent to F h (S) and F h (S) is a full reduction. Since F k (S) = F h (S) and since ∼ is transitive we have L k (S) ∼L h (S).
